I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of "standing" is a dangerous absurdity. It is an absurdity because it completely fails to achieve its stated purpose, has no grounding in the text or structure of the Constitution, and is the most incoherent and manipulable "rule" the Supreme Court has ever contrived. It is dangerous because it keeps individuals from having legitimate grievances heard in a court of law, insulates egregiously unconstitutional laws from review, and renders large swathes of the Constitution into mere nugatory aspirations.
Standing doctrine will be familiar to anyone who has practiced in a federal court or completed a legal education in the United States in the past forty years. According to the Supreme Court, the "irreducible minimum" of standing is composed of the plaintiff showing an actual or threatened injury that can be traced to the defendant, and that is redressable by the court.
further. It argues not that the standing doctrine should be tinkered with or liberalized, but instead that, at least when the constitutionality of a statute or act is in question, the doctrine should be wholly abolished. 10 In short, the standing doctrine does not deserve to be at the front of every published decision involving federal law, but buried so deep in the graveyard of discredited and discarded judicial inanities that it can never be dug up again.
In place of standing, this Article proposes that any individual be afforded the opportunity to contest the constitutionality of any statute or government act.
11 Article III courts would become open constitutional courts.
12 This proposition may seem breathtakingly radical at first glance. However, it is only radical to the extent that the idea of an entrenched written constitution was once thought radical, or that judges should have the ability to declare legislation void was once unthinkable. The ratification of the United States Constitution was a seismic shift in the history of law, an event that was an order of magnitude different than what had gone before. The rule of law, as incarnated in the Constitution, that the powers of every member of every branch of government are limited in crucial ways cannot be served if recourse to that fundamental document can be made only in the fortuitous event that an individual suffers an "actual injury." 13 plaintiff could not present case adequately, factual concreteness was lacking, or plaintiffs more directly affected would be likely to come forward).
10 Accord Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System Justification, and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 157 (2011) ("The convoluted doctrine that evolved from the Court's disingenuous interpretation of 'case' or 'controversy' must be forsaken completely. Merely modifying the requirements of standing will do little to guard against privilege and political decisionmaking. Instead, the entire language of standing must be removed from the judicial toolbox."). Sundquist's article reaches many of the same conclusions as I do, although we reach these conclusions through somewhat different arguments. 11 This proposal is limited to claims based upon the Constitution, which are referred to generally as "constitutional cases" in this Article. The standing doctrine is used to prohibit a wide variety of other lawsuits and is especially dominant in administrative law cases involving environmental law. This Article does not take a position on the suitability of standing requirements in nonconstitutional cases. 12 This description is borrowed from the title of Patrick Keyzer's book proposing the The reasons for retaining the murky and confused standing requirement in constitutional cases are astonishingly poor once one looks below the surface. There is no contemporary evidence that the framers meant the "case or controversy" limitation in Article III to create a standing barrier.
14 In fact, the notion of standing was unknown to the framers' generation, and for over a century, the Supreme Court entertained cases that today would not meet the Court's test. 15 Basing the application of standing doctrine on the supposed necessity of ensuring the separation of powers completely ignores the related necessity of what we today call maintaining checks and balances. 16 The framers were far more concerned with Congress or the President exceeding their powers than they were of the Supreme Court doing so. 17 In any event, the standing doctrine is a ridiculously poor device for ensuring separation of powers because it is essentially random in nature. Standing doctrine instructs federal judges not to decide a subset of cases, but that subset of cases bears no direct relationship with the very different subset of cases that could induce an unwary court to expand its powers 14 See discussion infra Part III. 15 See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875) (allowing plaintiffs to move for a mandamus that would enforce a public duty). 16 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) ("The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . . ."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 261 (James Madison) ("To what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the [C] onstitution? The only answer that can be given is . . . the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 828 (1969) ("Overemphasis of the 'separation of powers,' however, is apt to obscure the no less important system of 'checks and balances.'"). 17 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. . . . The observation, if it proved anything, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body."); Berger, supra note 16, at 832, 834 ("We must remember that the present stature of Congress by no means corresponds to the place it occupied in the minds of the Founders. For them Congress was an object not of awe but of apprehension," and "the founders must have welcomed any traditional mechanism that could aid in keeping Congress within bounds.").
illegitimately. In other words, the Judicial Branch already has every opportunity it could ever ask for to aggrandize power unto itself simply by deciding on the merits cases in which an actual injury exists. Carving out an unrelated subset of cases from judicial cognizance has no more effect on the overall separation of powers than if judges were to roll dice for each constitutional case and dismiss the action when snake eyes turn up. Policy arguments that standing is necessary for an adversarial process that sharpens the issues and allows for introduction of the best available evidence simply fails in light of the fact that, historically, many plaintiffs who do have traditional standing litigate the constitutionality of acts or laws for purely ideological purposes and make quite good adversaries for the government. As for the floodgates argument, the time and money involved in shepherding a case through the American legal system is enough to deter all but the most determined litigants, regardless of a standing requirement. Even for wealthy or persistent litigants, courts would retain their traditional ability to dismiss frivolous or vexatious claims. The cases that would make it through are cases in which a serious, arguable claim exists that a statute or governmental act violates the Constitution. Those are the types of cases federal courts should want to hear, as they go to one of the fundamental reasons for the courts' existence. On the other hand, the case for abolishing the standing requirement rests on a simple foundation that is as sound as the Constitution itself: For the Constitution to be law, it must be enforceable; but the standing doctrine has rendered several portions of the Constitution functionally void. 18 If it is reasonable to assume that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be more than merely a list of rhetorical exhortations, then it must also be reasonable to assume they would not want the judiciary to pick and choose which portions to enforce based on whether the plaintiff suffered an arbitrary and amorphous "injury in fact." The standing doctrine itself is the injury in fact, as it limits the ability to enforce the fundamental law of the nation. The rule of law cannot exist when citizens are functionally prohibited from finding out whether those laws are valid to begin with. Simply put, everyone has an interest and a right to know whether the laws which purport to bind them are, in fact, constitutional. 
plaintiffs, 20 "bystanders," 21 and "busybodies" 22 that the Court dismisses so callously as not being worthy of its time should in fact be praised as civicminded individuals who care about the country and the direction it is headed. Such plaintiffs may be wrong, shortsighted, selfish, or naive; but at least they are not apathetic. They do not deserve the special humiliation of being told not only that they have lost, but that they had no business playing the game in the first place. 23 If their claims are meritless, our courts are quite capable of dismissing their suits accordingly, and no harm is done. However, if they present even an arguable case that a law or action is unconstitutional, they should be heard, because if they are right, then they have given our system of constitutional supremacy a chance to function as intended. We need not live in "fear of too much justice."
24

II. THE NULLIFICATION EFFECT
A constitution can mean something, or it can mean nothing. It can be binding on the government, or it can be a long series of good suggestions to be discarded when convenient. It can be judicially enforceable or judicially ignored. There is no mystery as to where the U.S. Constitution
John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 96 (1985) ("When government violates the Constitution, the stake in the outcome of the controversy is society's stake, and is the most fundamental interest possible: the interest in government functioning as agreed upon by its creators."). Ironically, for the purposes of criminal prosecutions, defendants are presumed by law to know what the law is, but the standing doctrine often prevents us from knowing whether a law is constitutional.
20 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) falls on the spectrum. The entire thrust of the document itself and the context of its origins indicate the desire to simultaneously grant and limit power. The notion that the Judicial Branch serves as a key protection against the expansion of executive and legislative power is reflected in multiple places in The Federalist Papers, such as in Number 78:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
25
The U.S. Constitution was meant to be enforceable, and except for the Preamble, was meant to be enforceable in its entirety. The framers took their work seriously and did not anticipate that only certain portions of the Constitution would be afforded weight in the future. Hamilton noted, " [T] here ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions."
26
On this, Chief Justice Marshall was in agreement: "It cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C] onstitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it."
27 Any judicial doctrine that effectively excises multiple guarantees and prohibitions from the Constitution is a gross betrayal of this fundamental precept, and should be treated accordingly. Yet, this is precisely the effect of the standing doctrine. A concise summary of oft-discussed examples will demonstrate the point.
In Ex parte Lévitt involved a challenge to then-Senator Hugo Black's appointment and confirmation to the Supreme Court on the basis that, while in the Senate, he assisted in passing legislation to provide all members of the Supreme Court with full pensions upon retirement at or after the age of seventy. 32 As one of the few scholarly treatments of the Emoluments Clause notes:
[T]he remuneration available at age seventy to a Justice who no longer desired active service had increased significantly-from zero to full salary. . . . This enhanced financial package made the office of Associate Justice more attractive than it had been, creating a disability under the Emoluments Clause that should have prevented Black's appointment until his Senate term ended . . . .
33
The Supreme Court, faced with its first opportunity to give meaning to the Emoluments Clause, shirked away from its responsibility on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing.
34 After all, he was only a citizen and member of the Supreme Court bar, and had "merely a general interest common to all members of the public."
35
It is fair to say that the Emoluments Clause is a relatively minor and obscure provision of the Constitution, and that Black, in the eyes of many, turned out to be an excellent judge who did much to further the cause of civil liberties. The framers considered the ultimate issue in the case-the relationship between military and civilian influence in Congress-to be serious and compelling. The issue was also one that could not simply be left to the political branches to resolve, as collusion to undermine civilian control would be possible. But leaving it to Congress was exactly the effect of the Court's decision to dismiss the case for lack of standing because the plaintiffs had not suffered "concrete injury." 46 The Court remarked, "The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries. There is no great mystery as to the purpose of this provision: the need for Congress and the Executive to remain accountable for their spending to the people who elect them is obvious.
51
Without knowing how much money is spent, and for what purpose, the electorate cannot determine whether government officials are keeping their promises and directing the machinery of government to achieve the priorities that the nation as a whole has set. 52 A statement of expenditures is also a crucial way to uncover errors and corruption.
53
In Richardson, the plaintiff sought, under the Regular Statement and Account Clause, to force publication of the amount of money Congress appropriated to the CIA and a general description of how the appropriation was used. 54 Since the CIA's inception, Congress's standard practice has been to conceal any appropriations to the CIA through appropriations to other government agencies, and then to have the Office of Management and Budget transfer the funds from those agencies to the CIA.
55
The practice has the intended effect of keeping the budget of the CIA confidential, and the unintended effect of making it impossible for the 48 See Dow, supra note 43, at 1213 ("That the incompatibility clause protects all Americans equally scarcely seems reason enough to deny to a group of them the power to raise the issue in the federal courts."). 49 The issue raised in this case is a good one. On the one hand, the practice of secretly funding the CIA appears to violate the constitutional provision requiring a "regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money."
57
On the other, the argument for national security seems plausible, and the Court has often afforded weight to that interest in other contexts when interpreting the Constitution.
58 One could imagine multiple reasonable ways to resolve the tension. The Court could have said that the funds appropriated to the CIA could remain concealed "off-book," but could not be hidden in a way that distorted the published appropriations directed towards other agencies. Alternatively, the Court could have said that "lump sum" appropriations to the CIA must be disclosed, but not in such detail that they could reasonably pose a risk to national security. 59 The Court even could have said it would defer to Congress's judgment regarding both national security implications in this context and whether to allow the current practice to continue unchanged. In some of those results, the plaintiff would have been satisfied, and in others, he would clearly have lost. In every result, however, the provision would have remained effectively valid and enforceable if Congress tried to conceal appropriations that had nothing to do with national security. The worst possible result would have been to say that the plaintiff had no right to bring the case in the first place because that renders the provision unenforceable in every instance-that is exactly what the Court did. 56 See id. at 619-20 ("Because the funds transferred to the CIA can come from any government agency, the Congress and the public cannot with assurance accept the account covering any government agency as the regular statement and account the Constitution requires.").
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. See Dow, supra note 43, at 1213 (" [The plaintiffs'] claim [in Richardson] was that the Constitution guarantees all Americans the right to know how the various agencies of government spend their money. This was not an abstract grievance about political theory; it was an assertion that the Constitution compels an open and accountable government which fully discloses its expenditures."); Note, supra note 51, at 619-20 ("Such practices must be judged a prima facie violation of the first part of the Clause. . . . The auditing procedure suggested by the second part of the Clause is also abrogated."). 58 See Note, supra note 51, at 627. 59 This alternative is the one favored in Note, supra note 51, at 633 ("The Constitution requires, at a minimum, lump-sum appropriation and accounting, and an end to secret transfer of funds.").
By denying the plaintiff standing because he is simply a taxpayer, a voter, and not "in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury," 60 the Court has asked us all to take out scissors and excise the Regular Statement and Account Clause from the Constitution (remember to remove the Eligibility and Incompatibility Clauses as well). If "mere" taxpayers or voters have no right to enforce the provisions, no one will. According to the Court in Richardson:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. . . . Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them. 61 Thus, to its credit, the Court recognized the obvious consequences of the standing doctrine when those consequences are applied to the structural guarantees in the Constitution: no one will have standing, and those provisions will fall outside the scope of judicial review. 62 To its discredit, however, the Court seemed satisfied with this result and justified its satisfaction by offering a condescending middle-school civics lesson on democracy. However, that answer could be used to sweep away the entire institution of judicial review-Why not make the entire Constitution nonbinding and leave it to the political process to enforce? The justification given by the Court is as absurd as the result. How could members of the electorate decide that Congress was giving too much-or too little-funding to the CIA without seeing a regular statement of appropriations? It makes no sense to leave it "to the political process" if participants in that process lack information crucial to making a decision. Similarly, how could it make sense that members of Congress are to decide for themselves whether their roles as legislators are compatible with membership in the military under the Incompatibility Clause or whether they should be barred from assuming offices in the Executive Branch when they voted to increase the financial attractiveness of that appointment under the Emoluments Clause? Again, The Federalist Papers is on point:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the [C]onstitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.
64
A reasonable assumption is that specific prohibitions and guarantees placed in the text of the Constitution were to be more than mere rhetorical devices to be used and manipulated during "the political process." 65 The framers saw both the necessity and the danger of power. If a limitation on litigated. . . . The Court reasoned that this was not a problem arising from an unduly rigid insistence on concrete facts, but further proof that the issue was not meant to be litigated. Thus did the Court shore up one dubious assumption about its role with another.").
64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton). 65 Dow, supra note 43, at 1213. Dow expresses concern that standing is problematic when societal rights are at issue: "The consequence of this insistence is that under current doctrine, no one may enforce societal rights. Societal rights thus cease to be constitutional guarantees at all and become instead merely words." Id. at 1199.
power was to be left solely to the discretion of Congress or to the voters at the ballot box, that limitation would not have been explicitly placed in the Constitution to begin with. 66 And if a limitation is in the Constitution, there is no rational reason for rendering it a nullity simply because the plaintiff has not satisfied whatever vague and ever-changing definition of "injury" the Court has adopted since it last changed its mind a month or a year before. The precise limitation in the Constitution is what is important, not who happens to bring it to the Court's attention.
This nullification problem of using standing in constitutional cases is not confined to the Emoluments, Incompatibility, and Regular Statement and Account Clauses. Apart from the guarantees listed in the Bill of Rights, many of the limitations on government are of a nature in which "actual injury" is unlikely. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment's prohibition on members of Congress raising their salaries during their current term in office is a good example: no one, including taxpayers or members of Congress themselves, has standing to litigate a claim under the Amendment. 67 The issue may still have political ramifications, but it had that before the Amendment was ratified-its presence in the Constitution makes little difference. Presumably, nothing but political pressure could stop Congress from raising the compensation of a popular president during a term in office despite a clear prohibition from doing so in the Constitution, 68 Similarly, the restriction in Article I, Section Nine, Clause Eight that prohibits Congress from bestowing titles of nobility is unenforceable, despite Hamilton calling it "the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people."
70
Even the Establishment Clause survives only because the Court crafted two narrow, and somewhat idiosyncratic, exceptions to the normal standing doctrine to allow challenges to be made. Any laws involving actual coercion or that burden the exercise of religion would create injuries for the purpose of standing, but such laws could be challenged under the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom.
71
For the Establishment Clause to have an independent meaning, it must apply to laws that neither are coercive nor burden individual religious practice. However, a law directing funds to a particular religion, or even establishing a national church, would not constitute an actual injury to any individual. injury to that person to constitute standing. 74 The contradiction is evident: the Supreme Court defines injuries broadly under the Establishment Clause and narrowly under the rest of the Constitution. The reason for the contradiction is evident as well: without it, the Constitution's fundamental guarantee of government neutrality towards religion would be gutted. The problem is that the Supreme Court has effectively picked which provisions of the Constitution are judicially enforceable through the manipulable and nontransparent facade of an inquiry into standing.
75
The nullification objection to the standing doctrine is enough on its own to demonstrate that the doctrine is a bizarre and irrational gloss on the fundamental precepts contained in the Constitution. Standing is the Courtmosquito's proboscis, which sucks the lifeblood out of constitutional provisions.
76
If the Constitution clearly demanded an inquiry into standing, then the principle of fidelity to the text would understandably outweigh other concerns. However, as explained in the next section, nothing compels, or even permits, the Court to entangle the Constitution with the judicially-conjured standing doctrine. he Court has also held that outside the Establishment Clause context, psychological injuries with slight or tenuous connections to alleged constitutional violations are not sufficient injuries for standing purposes. The general stance against purely psychic or ideological injuries is in tension with Flast and current Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence."). Apart from its impact on environmental law, the relationship between standing and the Establishment Clause is perhaps the most frequently discussed aspect of the doctrine, and for that reason will not be discussed further here.
75 See Pierce, supra note 9, at 1762 ("Any judge can write a reasonably well-crafted opinion granting or denying standing in a high proportion of cases. The Supreme Court has issued so many opinions on standing with so many versions of injury, causation, redressability, and zone of interests that any competent judge can find ample precedent to support broad or narrow versions of each of the doctrinal elements that together comprise the law of standing." 
III. THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY CRUTCH
The requirement that litigants demonstrate standing is purportedly mandated by the Constitution's statement that the "judicial power" of the United States extends to a described list of "cases" and "controversies."
77
The words "cases" and "controversies," given their ordinary meaning, would not imply a standing limitation. 78 If a court hosted a motivated plaintiff and an uncompromising defendant to do something "judicial" (such as deciding on the constitutional validity of a law), the vast majority of people would declare this to be a case. The ordinary definition of controversy is even broader. 79 It is perfectly plausible, however, that what the framers meant by cases or controversies in the constitutional context is very different; the meanings of words change over time. Putting aside the issue of how much weight should be given to original intent, the inquiry becomes whether there is historical evidence that the words cases or controversies in a judicial context were limited to circumstances in which the plaintiff had suffered an actual injury. The answer to that inquiry is quite clear: No. Three results from this inquiry conclusively support this answer.
First, no evidence exists that the framers intended cases or controversies to be words of limitation equivalent to standing. Neither those words nor any notion of standing were the subject of discussion during the drafting of the Constitution. 80 that "'standing' was neither a term of art nor a familiar doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted."
81
Moreover, Cass Sunstein writes that "there is no direct evidence that injury in fact or concrete interest was intended to be a constitutional prerequisite under Article III."
82 Even if, in the absence of direct evidence, one was to infer that the framers intended the language to reflect the requirements of the English common law they were familiar with, 83 standing doctrine still finds no support. Jacob Reitz notes "the long pre-revolutionary history in England of courts giving advisory opinions and entertaining suits by persons without injury to personal interests," 84 a proposition that Berger supports by referencing the frequent practice of giving "strangers" authority to initiate litigation through a variety of procedural devices.
85 Richard Pierce examined four historical studies on the matter and concludes: "The findings of the four historical studies are remarkably consistent. Both English and colonial courts regularly resolved disputes brought by 'strangers' and 'informers.' Neither English nor colonial courts applied any jurisdictional limit that bore any resemblance to the modern law of standing." 86 Indeed, in The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton distinguished the judiciary's role of enforcing the Constitution from its role of resolving private rights, noting that independence was necessary for both roles.
87
Nowhere did he imply that the former should occur only as an occasional and fortuitous by-product of the latter. Susan Bandes sums up the point well:
Nothing in [A]rticle III demands loyalty to the private rights model. The spare "case or controversy" language by its terms dictates at most that the courts operate within a sphere of expertise distinct from that of the political branches. Adherence to the private rights model is 81 Berger, supra note 16, at 818. 82 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 173. 83 See Pierce, supra note 9, at 1764 (interpreting Madison's statement to suggest "that the Framers wanted to restrict the courts to resolving the types of disputes they had traditionally resolved"). 84 Second, throughout its history, the Supreme Court has regularly heard cases in which plaintiffs had not suffered injuries. In revisionist history worthy of 1984, the Court claims that not only is it applying standing doctrine now, but that it always has applied it: "We have always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement." 89 This is bad history or a blatant lie, as the widespread existence of the qui tam action demonstrates:
The purpose of this action is to give citizens a right to bring civil suits to help in the enforcement of the federal criminal law. Under the qui tam action, a citizen-who might well be a stranger-is permitted to bring suits against offenders of the law. Qui tam actions are familiar to American law. . . . In the first decade of the nation's existence, Congress created a number of qui tam actions. . . . The qui tam action was accompanied by the informers' action. Through this action, people can bring suit to enforce public duties; successful plaintiffs keep a share of the resulting damages or fines.
90
The reason that qui tam and informers' actions are important is that they are perfect examples of historically viable actions that do not involve any injury to the plaintiff. Surely, Congress would not have enacted so many statutes authorizing such actions in so many varied contexts 91 if the Supreme Court had explicitly stated that they violated Article III. 88 Bandes, supra note 63, at 283. Bandes's article makes a strong case that the Court's interpretation of the "case or controversy" language is deeply misguided.
89 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997 In a related context, Sunstein notes the 1875 case, Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hall, 92 involving the issue of whether Union Pacific was required to utilize a particular railroad bridge between Omaha, Nebraska, and Council Bluffs, Iowa, as part of its statutory duty to operate "as one connected, continuous line." 93 The plaintiffs, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the company to use the bridge, were simply merchants who used Union Pacific to transport their wares from time to time. The Court noted that "they had no interest other than such as belonged to others engaged in employments like theirs, and the duty they seek to enforce by the writ is a duty to the public generally."
94
The Court discussed the defendant's objection to the plaintiffs' ability to seek enforcement of a public duty without gaining the assent of the Attorney General, and framed the question as "whether private persons can sue out the writ to enforce the performance of a public duty, unless the non-performance of it works to them a special injury." 95 The Court, approving of an English case that held that private persons could sue, 96 also answered the question in the affirmative. 97 In fact, the Court even dismissed what must have been an old trope-even at that point-about how such a permissive doctrine "exposes a defendant to be harassed with many suits."
98 Notably, nowhere in the lengthy opinion did the Court mention Article III's reference to cases and controversies.
A recent article by Elizabeth Magill shows that even in the twentieth century the Court still heard challenges brought by individuals who had suffered no actual injury themselves. 99 Magill notes that the principle of "standing for the public" had currency even as it sometimes operated alongside a more restrictive doctrine in other cases: 92 91 U.S. 343 (1875); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 174. 93 Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. at 343-44 (quoting Pacific Railroad Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, 495 (1862) The "standing for the public" principle began in 1940, persisted into the 1970s, 104 and was clearly at odds with precedents that took a more restrictive view of standing.
105
Taken as a whole, the widespread existence of qui tam and informers' actions, the mandamus ruling by the Court in Union Pacific Railroad, and the Sanders Brothers "standing for the public" cases make it clear that any attempt by the Court to pretend it has always required an injury-in-fact under Article III's case or controversy requirement is doomed to failure. 106 Occasionally plaintiffs use the following statement by the Marbury Court as support for standing doctrine: "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." Marbury v. Third, the standing doctrine is a relatively recent judicial creation. Scholars' accounts vary somewhat on exactly when the doctrine came into existence: Berger suggests 1923, 107 William Fletcher argues that "an articulated separate law of standing did not exist until the 1930's," 108 and Pierce notes that " [t] he first opinion that stated in dicta that Article III standing limits judicial power was issued in 1944" while " [t] he first opinion that referred to 'injury-in-fact' as an Article III limit on judicial power was issued in 1970."
109 The bottom line is that "a strong scholarly consensus holds that standing's injury requirement is a twentieth-century invention."
110
The Court has a penchant for referring to the seemingly open-ended cases or controversies language in Article III as if they constituted a secret, Da Vinci Code-style cryptogram that only the Court's own keen powers of observation could unlock to reveal a hidden Eleventh Commandment: "Thou Shalt Not Suffer the Uninjured to Litigate." Just like that novel's "revelations," a few moments of reflection and research make it clear that the judicially-concocted edifice of "standing doctrine" has no historical merit. Pre-American Revolution English common law did not recognize a doctrine equivalent to standing; neither did colonial courts. The framers never described the grant of judicial power as including only those who could demonstrate an injury, nor is there any evidence that they intended the words cases or controversies to be words of limitation. The Supreme Court, in every century of its existence except for the current one, often heard claims from litigants who could not demonstrate standing under today's ever-shifting standards. Any claim that faithful adherence to the text of the Constitution, the intent of the framers, or long-settled precedent requires the use of the standing doctrine in constitutional cases is simply unwarranted. the use of this quotation is inapt: Marshall is discussing occasions where political discretion has been given to the Executive; obviously, this discretion must give way where limited by constitutional text.
107 See Berger, supra note 16, at 818-19. 108 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 247 (1988) . 109 Pierce, supra note 9, at 1765. 110 Murphy, supra note 9, at 968. Some have argued that the origins of standing lay in the desire of New Deal-era members of the Court to insulate progressive legislation from attack, much like standing doctrine today is often favored by conservative members of the Court to defend legislation from left-leaning civil liberties and environmental groups. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 6, at 179.
IV. ABSOLUTE SEPARATION CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY
The standing doctrine has allowed the Court to exercise a false humility. "You see," one can imagine the Court saying in reference to the doctrine, "we don't like interfering with the other branches and only do it when we absolutely must!" Separation of powers, although not a concern during the origins of the standing doctrine, has become the primary justification for the standing doctrine's continued existence and application.
111 Indeed, the Court has identified the standing doctrine as part of its "overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere."
112 Reading case after case, one gets the impression that the standing doctrine is the lone, solitary fortress that allows citizens to escape the apocalyptic scenario of judicial activism and court-led tyranny. Taken at face value, the separation of powers explanation for the standing doctrine paints a portrait of the Court as a model of consistent self-restraint, refusing to aggrandize power unto itself at the expense of democracy.
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The problems with this justification are twofold.
First, the standing doctrine is wholly inadequate as a safeguard against judicial encroachment on executive or legislative power because it operates 
.").
112 Raines, 521 U.S. at 820. 113 Heather Elliott notes that the standing doctrine purports to serve multiple aspects of separation of powers, including the "pro-democracy" function (avoiding undue judicial interference with the political branches) and the "anti-conscription" function (preventing Congress from enlisting the courts in carrying out legislation in contravention of the Executive Branch's requirement to "take care" that the laws are "faithfully executed"). Elliott, supra note 9, at 468. See also Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 REV. , 1794 REV. -95 (1993 . In constitutional cases, the "pro-democracy" aspect of separation of powers is the main concern; the "anticonscription" aspect assumes greater importance in the variety of "citizen-suit" provisions enacted by Congress that do not involve constitutional claims. Under the analysis in this Article, there can be no valid basis to complain that, in constitutional cases, the judiciary is interfering with the executive's "take care" function because that function only extends to laws that are constitutionally valid to begin with.
in an essentially arbitrary fashion. The "injury-in-fact" criterion bears no particular or principled correlation to the propriety of judicial intervention in any given case. The subset of all cases in which an injury-in-fact occurs does not meaningfully relate to the subset of all cases in which the judicial branch is constitutionally, and therefore properly, charged with resolving the dispute. The standing doctrine operates on the implicit assumption that injury and propriety are linked, but an explanation as to how or why is nonexistent. 114 As David Driesen notes, "If one assumes that a proper judicial case requires injury, then one can say that any case without an injury is an improper proceeding. . . . But this linking does not explain why a proper judicial proceeding must have injury; it just assumes it to be true."
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As discussed previously, there are several cases where injury is lacking, but where the Constitution clearly contemplates intervention. Similarly, there are several cases where injury is clearly present, but where the Court is still faced with enormous temptation to overreach and interfere with democratically elected decision-makers. 116 The natural conclusion is that the presence or absence of injury does not validate or invalidate judicial intervention in constitutional cases. The only plausible basis to determine if the Court should intervene in a constitutional case is the Constitution itself, and the document is silent on a standing requirement. REV. 808, 824 (2004) . Examining the connection between the separation of powers theory and injury-in-fact, Driesen asserts:
[A] theory of standing must explain why that [proper] role [for the Court] justifies a particular standing doctrine, such as the requirement that litigants experience injury-in-fact.
The Court's desire to avoid improper interference in the political decisions of the executive and legislative branches does not explain injury-based standing any more than a simple statement that a court must remain within its proper role.
Id.
115 Id. at 825 (emphasis added S. 113 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) as examples of cases "of the utmost national importance" and that "arguably satisfied the current tripartite standing test," but which "are examples of judicial power affecting large segments of society").
The effect of the standing doctrine then is to simply carve out, essentially arbitrarily, a select subset of cases from the Court's cognizance. In one respect, every constitutional claim the Court refuses to consider is a case in which the Court has not exceeded its proper boundaries and has thus avoided a conflict with the Executive or Legislative Branches.
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Aggregating every single occasion where the Court has determined that standing is lacking leads to a large number of cases where the Court could have exercised power but chose not to. Before the Court can be lauded for its abstemious virtue, however, a further inquiry must be made: In how many of those cases where the Court could have acted and chose not to should it have acted? Refusing to exercise power when constitutional duty demands action is no better than excessively exercising power in fulfilling that same duty.
On a related second point, this overriding concern for separation of powers conflicts with the equally fundamental role of the Court as an institution constitutionally charged with checking the Legislative and Executive Branches. 118 The Court has a legitimate goal in ensuring that the judiciary remains within its proper sphere, but only in conjunction with the goal of ensuring that the Executive and Legislative Branches remain within theirs. The standing doctrine in constitutional cases purports to achieve the former and completely neglects the latter. Separation of powers and checks and balances have to work simultaneously, as made clear in The Federalist Papers:
[T]he political apothegm [that separation of powers is necessary to good government] does not require that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments should be 117 See Scott, supra note 5, at 690 n.173. On the Court staying within its bounds, Scott offers the following opinion:
It is true . . . that any case knocked out on access standing grounds, or on any other grounds, is one less case which may present problems related to the policy role of the courts. Such an approach, however, is unselective to the point of being indiscriminate, unless one assumes, for example, that the incidence of decision role difficulties is markedly higher among cases in which access standing is questionable than among cases in which it is not. The two categories may overlap, but it is far from evident that they are highly correlated . . . .
Id.
118 See Berger, supra note 16, at 828 ("Overemphasis of the 'separation of powers,'
however, is apt to obscure the no less important system of 'checks and balances.'").
wholly unconnected with each other. . . .
[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in practice, be duly maintained.
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By insulating executive and legislative action from review, unless the action happens to cause a discrete injury to an identifiable individual, the Court effectively abandons its responsibility to ensure that those actions comply with the Constitution. Those branches are, in effect, given a free pass as long as their actions affect only society at large and not individuals directly, contrary to clear textual limitations in the Constitution. Raoul Berger said it best over a half century ago:
A legislative usurpation does not change character when it is challenged by a stranger; and judicial restraint [of that usurpation] remains a "judicial" function, not an "intrusion," though undertaken at the call of one without a personal stake. No hint that judicial restraint of legislative usurpation was to hinge on the suitor's "interest" is to be found in the records of the Constitutional Convention.
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It seems odd to have to remind the Court that the checking function is as essential to the structure of the Constitution as the separation principle. As the Court in Marbury noted, "It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the [C]onstitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; . . . ."
121 Why would standing, a historically novel doctrine of relatively recent invention and ever-changing scope, be used to justify undermining the most fundamental responsibility entrusted to the Supreme Court? This thinking must be mistaken. The analysis must be faulty. Surely, the Court has additional grounds for propounding a doctrine that can be easily picked apart by legal novices. There must be something more. But is there? 119 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1, at 250 (James Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 261 (James Madison) ("To what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, . . . by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."). 120 Berger, supra note 16, at 829. 
V. FACTS, FLOODGATES, FRIENDS, AND FOREIGNERS
This Article establishes that nothing in the text or structure of the Constitution supports applying the standing doctrine in constitutional cases. In the absence of the standing doctrine, virtually every lawsuit alleging a violation of the Constitution would be decided on the merits. If the challenged action or statute is deemed valid, no harm is done to another branch of government. An expectation that those branches defend themselves against claims asserting that they have violated the Constitution is not an unfair one in a nation based on the rule of law. If the challenged action or statute is deemed invalid, then a serious error-a violation of the country's fundamental law-is detected and cured. In each outcome, the Court has simply fulfilled its fundamental duty as the institution charged with enforcing the Constitution. The Court may overreach and violate the separation of powers, as it might in any case, but overreaching comes from how the Court handles the issue on the merits rather than its decision to hear the case in the first place.
The Court has made reference to reasons supporting the standing doctrine that are not constitutional in nature.
122 These nonconstitutional reasons are even less persuasive than the constitutional ones. Based on mere assertion and sheer speculation, the Court has repeatedly proclaimed that the standing doctrine assures a fact-rich context that leads to better decision-making while simultaneously stopping the "floodgates" from opening and overburdening the legal system with a deluge of groundless claims.
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The injury-in-fact element of the standing doctrine, the Court says, "tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be insisted on justiciability criteria that aim to make adjudication concrete, rather than abstract. On the other hand, it often relies upon abstract formalist reasoning to resolve cases on the merits, thereby gaining no benefit from the concrete context."). 127 See id. at 840. 128 Scalia, supra note 3, at 891-92 ("[I]f the purpose of standing is 'to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,' the doctrine is remarkably ill designed for its end. Often the very best adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no 'concrete injury in fact' whatever."). See also Jaffe, supra note 7, at 636-38; Kontorovich, supra note 111, at 1672-73 ("In practice, the injury requirement bars ideological or 'public interest' plaintiffs. These plaintiffs are often represented, however, by well-financed, skilled, and committed organizations. Ideological plaintiffs may in fact care much more than anyone else about the question. Nor does it appear that the attorneys for such plaintiffs fail to raise relevant considerations sharply enough."). Driesen also discusses the odd, persistent fear that the absence of standing doctrine will lead to "sham" litigation and advisory opinions. Driesen, supra note 114, at 819-20 ("As long as two parties genuinely disagree and the plaintiff seeks a judgment, not just advice, the litigation will be adverse and quite different from a request for a nonbinding advisory opinion. . . . Sham litigation might well include a plaintiff who can meet the requisites of standing, so constitutional standing requirements also seem ill-suited to the task of avoiding sham litigation.").
that all decisions must be made in a factual vacuum; the plaintiff still has the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of legislation or action, and if facts necessary to establish that claim are not presented, the plaintiff will lose. Moreover, trial judges retain sufficient discretion to order the parties before them to address factual inadequacies necessary to the proper determination of a constitutional issue. Another nonconstitutional objection to abolishing the standing requirement in constitutional cases is a fear that, if anyone can sue, then everyone will sue. Americans are commonly perceived to be litigious, and a "flood" of new claims could, in theory, swamp the judicial system. One notices this fear in the standing context less frequently now, especially after Kenneth Scott laid it to rest decades ago:
When the "floodgates" of litigation are opened to some new class of controversy by a decision, it is notable how rarely one can discern the flood that the dissenters feared. The plaintiff (or the organization actually funding and conducting the litigation, if legal rules force the use of nominal plaintiffs) must feel strongly enough about the issue in question to pay the bills, and that both cuts down the flood and gives us at least a partial measure of his "stake" in the outcome.
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Litigation is expensive-people, organizations, corporations, and governments litigate because they think it is important, not because it is fun. Every dollar that a public interest organization devotes to a new lawsuit is a dollar it is not spending on recruitment drives, educational outreach, lobbying, or some other activity. Simply put, there is no party out there with coffers full of money merely waiting for the Supreme Court to relax its guard so it can pounce and overwhelm the system. Scott sums it up nicely in his famous words: "The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not the courtroom."
130 Indeed, even after abolishing the standing doctrine in constitutional cases, courts would retain various means to control its docket. 131 129 Scott, supra note 5, at 673-74. 130 Id. at 674. 131 Sundquist, supra note 10, at 161 ("While the federal judiciary may find themselves short an arrow in their quiver of justiciability, there are still many procedural tools remaining to dispose of meritless and fantastical claims. Additionally, courts still will be free to resort to a multitude of prudential, sub-constitutional mechanisms to promote (continued) There is a more fundamental objection to the floodgates argument, and it is a simple one: the Constitution is our country's foundational legal document, and enforcing it trumps concerns over the amount of litigation it inspires. The words "Equal Justice Under Law" adorn the Supreme Court building, not "Efficient Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources."
Before continuing, it is important to acknowledge that the Court's approach to the standing doctrine has some lukewarm friends in the academy. After an extensive review of historical evidence, for example, Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson conclude:
We do not claim that history compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court's vision of standing, or that the constitutional nature of standing doctrine was crystal clear from the moment of the Founding on. The subsistence of qui tam actions alone might be enough to refute any such suggestion. We do, however, argue that history does not defeat standing doctrine; the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution's meaning.
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Suffice it to say, if that tepid and equivocal endorsement is the best its partisans can formulate, 133 then the standing doctrine is in trouble. Ostensibly riding to the rescue is a massive, 154-page article by Maxwell Stearns that argues, "[S]tanding substantially reduces opportunities for advertent path manipulation by non-Condorcet minorities." 134 I will not pretend to understand exactly what that means, but I am confident that the ratifiers of the Constitution thought that they were getting a document with binding, enforceable provisions to limit the dangerous abuses posed by government power, and that these same ratifiers were not particularly efficient judicial review."). Another writer in this context suggests using class action grouping to conserve judicial resources if standing is abolished. REV. 309, 337 (1995) .
What would fill the void if standing doctrine were abolished? Quite simply, a requirement that a plaintiff bring a serious-or nonfrivolousredressable claim that a specific American government statute, policy, practice, or activity violates a specific section of the United States Constitution. Patrick Keyzer has states it well in the Australian context: "Any person should have the opportunity to access constitutional justice so long as they raise a serious, arguable question of constitutional law. They should not be denied access by virtue or their identity or the extrapecuniary character of their constitutional questions."
140
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the standing doctrine is its longevity. It has persisted, decade after decade, with the Court justifying it periodically with little more than reflexive pablum about "cases or controversies" and "separation of powers." Devastating legal critiques of the standing doctrine were published over forty years ago, and the Court continues to ignore them, moving blithely on its present course of operating a veritable shell game, leaving litigants, lawyers, and lower-court judges to guess what will constitute an injury-in-fact on any given day. Meanwhile, one of the most fundamental axioms of our legal system-that constitutional provisions are meant to be supreme and enforceablecontinues to be evaded through a doctrinal farce.
